Category — America

By Christi Parsons and Paul Richter
Washington: President Obama and his top advisors are moving toward a strategy on Afghanistan that defines Al Qaeda as a greater threat to U.S. security than the Taliban, a view that could help them avoid the major troop increase sought by military commanders.

The evolving strategy represents a subtle shift for the administration, which has considered Osama bin Laden’s network its top enemy while viewing the Taliban as a close ally of Al Qaeda that supports its ambitions. White House officials now are taking pains to make distinctions between the two groups, branding Al Qaeda a global terrorist group and the Taliban a local movement.

Such a strategy could let U.S.-led forces concentrate on their successful strategy of using unmanned aircraft and missile strikes against Al Qaeda operatives and outposts in the remote region along the Afghan-Pakistani border.

A senior administration official indicated that in the fight against the Taliban, at a minimum the extremists would not be allowed to regain the strength to control Afghanistan or offer help to Al Qaeda, whose leadership is thought to be based in Pakistan.

“Are they violent adversaries? Yes,” the official wrote of the Taliban in an e-mail exchange. “And we would not tolerate their return to power as they were before 9/11.”

The new emphasis rekindled an 8-year-old debate about how closely Al Qaeda and the Taliban are aligned. Many experts agree they are distinct, but others see them as virtually interchangeable sets of militants.

White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said the administration considered Al Qaeda a “global, transnational, jihadist movement” that has attacked the U.S. before and would again.

The Taliban, meanwhile, is an “indigenous” movement centered in Afghanistan and Pakistan that includes “homegrown political actors with localized ambitions and concerns,” the senior administration official said.

In comments this summer, Obama indicated that the administration saw a link between the two groups.

In an address Aug. 17 to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Obama said:

“We must never forget. This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which Al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans.”

Bruce Riedel, a CIA veteran who led the Obama administration’s overhaul of its Afghanistan and Pakistan policies this year, said it was “a fundamental misreading of the nature of these organizations to think that they are anything other than partners.”

“Al Qaeda is embedded in the Taliban insurgency, and it’s highly unlikely that you’re going to be able to separate them,” he said.

Obama meets today with national security advisors as part of his review of Afghanistan strategy, and officials said he is at least a week away from any decisions on a new U.S. policy or troop levels. Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, has recommended sending up to 40,000 American troops, in addition to the 68,000 already there.

Top administration officials are skeptical about sending so many troops without a close examination of U.S. aims. That view has been influenced by a series of dismal developments, including the extremist violence in Afghanistan, a fraud-tainted presidential election there, and plummeting support for the war among the U.S. public and lawmakers.

Influential Democrats on Capitol Hill have expressed unease about a strategy that requires a major increase in the number of troops. But it is far from clear that they would undercut Obama by refusing an administration request for funds to pay for the conflict.

“People are unsure what do to,” said Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), a critic of the war who gathered more than 50 signatures on a letter to Obama opposing a troop increase. “I think people want to give the president more space and wait for his decision. But I thought it was important to try to send something to him before a final decision is made to let him know there is a lot of concern.”

Daniel Markey, an analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, said the White House emphasis on Al Qaeda may be a sign that the administration is unlikely to send the full complement of troops sought by McChrystal. The views of Al Qaeda and the Taliban are “presumably an argument for why a heavy emphasis on Afghanistan and the Taliban is misplaced,” said Markey, a former State Department official.

The Taliban inserted itself into the debate this week by posting a statement in English on one of its websites asserting that the group poses no threat to the West.

“We did not have any agenda to harm other countries, including Europe, nor do we have such agenda today,” said the statement, according to a report in the British newspaper the Guardian. “Still, if you want to turn the country of the proud and pious Afghans into a colony, then know that we have an unwavering determination and have braced for a prolonged war.”

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, in an appearance at George Washington University this week, said it was unclear whether Al Qaeda would move back into Afghanistan if given the opportunity.

But he added, “There’s no question in my mind that if the Taliban . . . took control of significant portions of Afghanistan, that would be added space for Al Qaeda to strengthen itself and [begin] more recruitment, more fundraising.”

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton views the Taliban as a foe as well.

“They’re not just a threat to the people of Afghanistan,” State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said Thursday. “The Taliban hosted and encouraged Al Qaeda. And the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 — the idea for them — was hatched in the Taliban-run Afghanistan. So I think that we do see the Taliban as a threat to U.S. security for that reason.”

A strategy centered on eliminating extremist enclaves in Pakistan carries additional risks. Though the U.S. and the Pakistani government have been successful in killing senior insurgents, U.S. officials acknowledge that they have limited influence in Pakistan. The U.S. strategy of using drone airstrikes there is deeply unpopular with Pakistanis.

This week, even U.S. aid sparked controversy. Pakistani political figures and military leaders were offended by the strings attached to a just- approved $1.5-billion-a-year aid package, and some have been pressing for revision of the U.S. legislation. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-obama-afghan9-2009oct09,0,4418683,print.story

Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram tell Indian Express
Excerpts from interaction with editors of the daily
•AMITABH SINHA: What were the specific results achieved during your recent US visit?
Much has been made of the Hafiz Saeed chapter but it was only one small part of the agenda. The main purpose of the visit was to work out an arrangement by which we can share intelligence on a real time basis and then to share analysis of intelligence. We also discussed access to technology. We need technology; we need to improve the skill sets of our people. Then there was the very important need to get to know the important people in the US on a personal basis. I believe the objectives were substantially achieved.

•RITU SARIN: Is there a qualitative difference in the nature of evidence we have against Hafiz Saeed and the evidence we have handed over to Pakistan on other 26/11 accused?
Yes, because Hafiz Saeed did not come to India. All his overt actions were done on Pakistan soil. So all I can give are leads as to what he did. The evidence is on Pakistan soil. If the Pakistan government throws up its hands and says it cannot or it is unwilling to investigate on Pakistan soil, that is a very sad commentary on the Pakistan police.

•AMITABH SINHA: You mean there is no evidence against him as of now and Pakistan will have to investigate further?
There are leads which amount to evidence. For example, when Kasab said Hafiz Saeed asked a man to set up 10 targets and asked each one of them to hit the targets and he was given target No 4 and he hit target No 4 and Hafiz Saeed personally complimented him on his accurate firing, that is a lead bordering on evidence which has to be substantiated by locating the place where the target practice took place, by talking to the people involved, by investigation. If these are confirmed, it is hard evidence.

•PRANAB DHAL SAMANTA: Is there any possibility of a joint investigation with Pakistan?
No more investigation needs to be done on Indian soil. We have filed the chargesheet, the trial is well on its way and is about to be concluded. All the investigation that has to be done now is on Pakistan soil. FBI asked for access, they (Pakistan) denied it. If they did not give access to FBI which is obliged to investigate the attacks since six American nationals were killed in 26/11, what chance do we have?

•AMITABH SINHA: So what is the way out?
I see the tunnel. I don’t see the end of the tunnel yet. We have a Letter Rogatory for Hafiz Saeed. We will follow the processes of law which are available to us. At some point of time, the Pakistan Government, I hope, will fall in line and investigate and help us gain access to the evidence of that investigation.

•RITU SARIN: At some stage, India will have to take a call on the nine bodies of the 26/11 perpetrators lying in cold storage in Mumbai.
What do we do? No Muslim organisation is willing to take those bodies and bury them. Pakistan has grudgingly accepted that some of them maybe Pakistani nationals. There must be some organisation which is willing to come forward to bury them and we are willing to work with them. They are dead and deserve a decent burial.

•MANU PUBBY: There has not been any major terrorist strike since the Mumbai attack. What has changed on the ground?
I don’t think there is any let-up in the plans of militant organisations in Pakistan, especially LeT and JeM. I think they continue to plan and plot. What has changed is that our intelligence sharing is now on a real-time basis and the level of alertness, vigilance of states is much better. We are proactively seeking out cells and modules to neutralise them. Let me say very candidly that while effort plays a big part, luck also pays a big part. We have to be ever vigilant and we have to raise our level of preparedness.

•VAIBHAV VATS: Is there any thought being given to repealing the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)?
We are proposing amendments to the AFSPA. As far as the presence of security forces in Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, I have said on the border, the army will be present. The paramilitary will be deployed in the hinterland to aid and assist the state police. And the state police will take the frontline in maintaining law and order.

http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/521990

By Ansar Abbasi
ISLAMABAD: In an obvious rebuke to President Asif Zardari’s efforts to seek massive aid from the world community, the global anti-corruption watchdog, the Transparency International, issued a stinging indictment on the eve of a high-profile New York meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, saying: “How can one expect from any donor to come forward to assist Pakistan from its current financial crisis, when there exist no law against corruption.”

President Zardari is to meet US President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and other world leaders at the Friends of Democratic Pakistan meeting in New York on Thursday but in its 2009 Global Corruption Report, released on Wednesday, Transparency International portrays Pakistan amongst the most corrupt nations in the world.

Releasing the annual report, the TI chief in Pakistan Adeel Gilani said anti-corruption efforts in the country had taken a 180 degree turn since Gen Pervez Musharraf issued the National Reconciliation Ordinance on October 5, 2007, 56 days after the ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption.

The timing for the release of the TI report would be embarrassing for President Zardari, whose government’s credibility is already seriously questioned internationally because of President’s own as well as many of his government’s key players’ past plagued by serious corruption charges.

Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin tried to soften the impact of the TI report by saying in his talks with US officials in New York, the US side had assured that most of the aid to Pakistan will be channelled through the federal government, although it is still not clear whether the US Congress will approve this.

A press release issued in Islamabad and New York, Syed Adeel Gilani, Chairman TI Pakistan, said the NRO has also granted further protection to the parliamentarians, as no sitting member of parliament or a provincial assembly can be arrested without taking into consideration the recommendations of the special parliamentary committees on ethics, which are not formed yet.

Gilani said over and above the NRO, the aims of the present government which has sent serious signals all over the world is that in Pakistan corruption will not be a crime if no accountability is held for three years. “The Draft Holder of Public Office Act 2009 prepared by the government to substitute the NAB Ordinance, under consideration of the National Assembly, gives further immunity to all against corruption from October 2010,” the report said, wondering, “How can one expect that any donor to come forward to assist Pakistan from its current financial crisis when there exist no law against corruption.”

The report said corruption is a serious problem in Pakistan, and this position is corroborated by a number of recent studies and reports. An assessment of Pakistan’s infrastructure implementation capacity was carried out at the request of the government, and the resulting report was published in November 2007 jointly by the World Bank and the planning Commission of Pakistan.

It states that approximately 15 per cent of the cost of corruption lies in procurement, costing the Pakistani development budget (2007/8) over Rs150 billion. Furthermore, the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator in 2007 ranks Pakistan a mere 21.3 out of 100. The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 ranked Pakistan 101st out of 130 countries and found that respondents pointed to corruption as the second most problematic factor for doing business in the country, after government instability.

The instability of the political situation in Pakistan cannot be underestimated as a factor in permitting corruption in the private sector to flourish. Despite Musharraf’s claim to be committed to fighting corruption, little headway has been made, and it is still considered to be ‘pervasive and deeply entrenched’.

Musharraf relinquished military power in November 2007, and his supporters were defeated in the February 2008 general election by a coalition of the Pakistan People’s Party and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League. Musharraf resigned in August 2008, facing impeachment for alleged crimes including gross misconduct and violation of the Constitution, it said.

The following is the Pakistan Chapter of the Global Report released on Sept 23: Legal and institutional changes: In a meeting with a delegation of TI Pakistan on 17 July 2007, the former prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, gave assurance that the Public Procurement Rules of 2004 would be implemented in all the federal government ministries. He also claimed that transparency was the ‘hallmark’ of government policy and that the government was promoting e-governance as a tool for more openness and in order to make processes more efficient. He claimed that the ëgovernment had made it mandatory that integrity pacts are signed for all government contracts over Rs10 million. Moreover, the adoption of the rules ëminimises discretion, gives priority to technical competence and ensures that award of contract is on the basis of lowest evaluated responsive bidder in the shortest possible timeí.

He also agreed with TI Pakistan that the Election Commission should ëhold the elections in the most transparent manner’. These commitments were undermined after the departure of the former prime minister in 2007. Under the caretaker government in 2008, complaints to the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority board were not acted upon.

The former president, General Pervez Musharraf, issued the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) on 5 October 2007, fifty-six days after the ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption. In many ways this was a setback for anti-corruption measures in Pakistan, as all proceedings under investigation or pending in any court that had been initiated by or involved the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) prior to 12 October 1999 were withdrawn and terminated with immediate effect. The NRO also granted further protection to parliamentarians, as no sitting member of parliament or a provincial assembly can be arrested without taking into consideration the recommendations of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Ethics or the Special Committee of the Provincial Assembly on Ethics.

Public ills, private woes — the survival of the private sector during political instability: Corruption is a serious problem in Pakistan, and this position is corroborated by a number of recent studies and reports. An assessment of Pakistanís infrastructure implementation capacity was carried out at the request of the government, and the resulting report was published in November 2007 jointly by the World Bank and the Planning Commission of Pakistan. It states that approximately 15 per cent of the cost of corruption lies in procurement, costing the Pakistani development budget (2007/8) over Rs150 billion.

Furthermore, the World Bankís Control of Corruption Indicator in 2007 ranks Pakistan a mere 21.3 out of 100. In terms of the business sector, there are a number of measures that indicate that there is a serious issue of corruption. TI’s Global Corruption Barometer 2006 reported that the impact of corruption on the private sector was perceived as almost equal to corruption in the public sector; and The Global Competitiveness Report 2008ñ2009 ranked Pakistan 101st out of 130 countries and found that respondents pointed to corruption as the second most problematic factor for doing business in the country, after government instability. The instability of the political situation in Pakistan cannot be underestimated as a factor in permitting corruption in the private sector to flourish. Despite Musharrafís claim to be committed to fighting corruption, little headway has been made, and it is still considered to be ëpervasive and deeply entrenchedí.

The inauguration of the new president, Asif Ali Zardari, on 9 September 2008 ushers in a new era, but not one without challenges. The new democratically elected government will, therefore, require the immediate enforcement of good governance and transparency standards to counter the various dire problems facing Pakistan. There is an increased threat of terrorism, hyperinflation, a reduction in the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Index, a sizeable depreciation of the currency, a substantial reduction in foreign currency reserves and a huge trade deficit inherited from the previous government.

Banking fines for cartels: the new Competition Commission: In Pakistan, monopolistic practices and cartels are perceived to hold sway in such businesses as banking, cement, sugar, automobiles, fertilisers and pharmaceuticals, to name a few. Although cartels distort market prices, they also create other anomalies. Existing players in an industry may firmly block the entry of new entrepreneurs through cartels, in order to ensure their own market dominance. This practice acts as a clear disincentive for the much-needed expansion of Pakistanís industrial base.

In October 2007 a new Competition Commission was set up under the Competition Ordinance 2007, in order to ëprovide for a legal framework to create a business environment based on healthy competition towards improving economic efficiency, developing competitiveness and protecting consumers from anti- competitive practicesí.

It was also meant to ërestrict the undue concentration of economic power, growth of unreasonable monopoly power and unreasonably restrictive trade practicesí, which are perceived to be ëinjurious to the economic well-being, growth and development of Pakistaní. In one of its first initiatives, the Competition Commission challenged the Pakistan Banks Association (PBA) on its decision to ëcollectively decide rates of profit and other terms and conditions regarding deposit accountsí. The PBA is a membership association to which only banks in Pakistan can be affiliated, and it advertised its decision openly in a daily newspaper on 5 November 2007. The terms of the agreement included a number of its member banks imposing ëa four per cent profit on Rs20,000 deposits and a Rs50 charge on less than a Rs5,000 balanceí on bank accounts included in the new Enhanced Savings Account (ESA) scheme. Furthermore, holders of basic accounts that met the criteria would have their accounts changed to ESAs without the prior instruction or agreement of the account-holders.

The Competition Commission considered this move by the PBA to be in violation of section 4 of the Competition Ordinance 2007, and, moreover, in acting as a cartel, the banks were alleged to have behaved anti-competitively. The implications of the changes included customers with balances of less than Rs5,000 having to pay Rs50 each month and the transfer of accounts without the account-holdersí prior permission.

On 24 December a ëshow-causeí was issued to the PBA and the banks, and they were asked to provide justification of their behaviour to the commission by 10 January 2008.

Both the PBA and the banks issued responses on 9 January, denying the charges of cartelisation, and on 28 February 2008 a further statement was issued, arguing that the commission did not have jurisdiction in this area and that, furthermore, the changes had been made ëat the behest of the regulator (the State Bank of Pakistan) in the larger public interestí. The PBA also argued that it could not be considered to be stifling competition as the deposit amounts affected by the ESA scheme amounted to only 2.25 per cent. The commission found later, however, that in terms of the number of account-holders affected the impact was much higher, constituting 45.12 per cent.

The final decision of the Competition Commission was made on 10 April 2008. The commission argued that the ëPBA has acted beyond its mandate…and has been instrumental in the formation of a cartelí. As a result, it had deprived small account-holders of the benefits they were otherwise earning on their savings accounts. The PBA and the culpable banks were ordered to discontinue the practice, not to repeat it and to pay considerable fines. The PBA was fined Rs30 million, and the seven banks involved were fined Rs25 million each.

The penalised institutions did have recourse to appeal to the appellate bench of the Competition Commission, but they failed to do so within the stipulated time. On 27 May the PBA did, however, appeal against the decision of the commission with the Sindh High Court, which ordered the commission not to take any action against the PBA before the decision had been adjudicated in court.

The commission appealed against the high courtís decision, and on 15 September 2008 the Supreme Court allowed the commission to proceed against the banks. The Competition Commissionís move against the banking cartel, as well as the support provided by the Supreme Court, is encouraging. It has sent the message that such practices by the private sector, including the maintenance of unreasonable power by monopolies and restrictive trade practices, will not be tolerated and that the institutions in charge of monitoring such practices have the power to act.

Privatisation of Pakistan Steel Mills: Corruption in privatisation in Pakistan is endemic: manipulation of the process can be found at all stages, from the evaluation of profits and assets of a company to the provision of kickbacks on completion of a settlement.

One of the most famous cases relating to privatisation involves the attempted privatisation of Pakistan Steel Mills. As Pakistanís largest and only integrated steel manufacturing plant, it is a private limited company, and 100 per cent of its equity is owned by the government. The plant is the biggest producer of steel in Pakistan and was installed in 1981, with the collaboration of Russia, by the Ministry of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives. In 1997 the government of Pakistan decided to privatise it, and, following the rules, secured approval from the Council of Common Interests.

In 1998 the privatisation of Pakistan Steel Mills was abandoned, and to make it profitable the labour force was reduced from 20,000 to 15,000.

As the steel mill had been designed, constructed and fitted out entirely by the Soviet Union, in February 2003 General Musharraf visited Moscow and signed an agreement to expand the production of the plantís steel from 1.1 million to 1.5 million tonnes. By December 2004, less than two years later, the privatisation of the plant was being discussed again, and by 10 February 2005 the decision to privatise the mill was taken by the government. The corporation, assessed at Rs72 billion, was sold to a consortium for Rs21.58 billion on 24 April 2006.

On 23 June 2006, the Supreme Court ruled against the privatisation, and Chief Justice Chaudhry prevented the sale of the state monopoly to the private investors.

The Supreme Court concluded that approving the award of the contract reflected disregard for the mandatory rules, as well as the information necessary for arriving at a fair sale price. The unexplained haste of the proceedings also cast reasonable doubt on the ethics of the whole exercise. While Chief Justice Chaudhry acknowledged that it was not the function of the court to interfere with the policy-making of the executive, the privatisation of the mills was ëvitiated by acts of omissioní and violated the mandatory provisions of laws and rules. The valuation of the project and the final terms offered to the consortium were not in accord with the initial public offering given through the advertisement.

This case had implications that still resonate today, as it is considered one of the causes of the dismissal of Chief Justice Chaudhry in March 2007, who was not reinstated until July 2008.

It is, therefore, partially responsible for a great civil society movement in Pakistan, which called for the restoration of an independent judiciary. There are also unanswered questions that still need resolution. In October 2006 a case was filed against the then prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, and ten other ministers, as well as the governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, alleging misuse of power ñ corruption as defined in section 9 of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999, which covers corruption and corrupt practices.

If found guilty, they would be subject to punishment, up to fourteen yearsí imprisonment, under section 10 of the ordinance for their involvement in the attempted privatisation of Pakistan Steel Mills. At the time of writing this report it was yet to be seen how the NAB, under the jurisdiction of the current government, will proceed with this case.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=24659

By Talat Masood
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general of Pakistan
When the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) coalition government assumed power in 2008, it provided President Zardari with an excellent opportunity to focus on Balochistan. Initially, he did raise hopes when, as head of PPP and being of Baloch descent, he made a public apology for all the wrong doings of the past against the Baloch people. This was followed by further conciliatory gestures by both the president and prime minister which resulted in the release of political detainees and a relatively relaxed political environment. Sadly, the momentum was lost and the province is once again adrift with insurgency taking a turn for the worse, as was evident on the third death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Bugti when the province came to a grinding halt.

Prior to the assassination of Akbar Bugti, the insurgency was primarily centered on Dera Bugti, but after his death it has spread beyond the tribal belt into settled areas of Makran, Sarawan and Jhalawan divisions. In fact, there is an on-going operation in Makran division. Target killings are on the rise and Shias and Punjabis are the main victims. In addition, gas pipelines and high-voltage transmission grids are being blown up, and the armed forces are being targeted. All three militant nationalist movements — the Balochistan Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Army and the Baloch Front are now engaged in low-level insurgency operations and are closely cooperating with one another in attacking military installations and civilian targets.

The Baloch nationalist leaders believe that the present civilian government, even if it wants to pursue a policy of reconciliation, will not succeed as the real policy is still being determined by the military intelligence as was the case during General Musharraf’s period. The Baloch leadership believes that the establishment is not prepared to shed control over their rich resources and there is lack of confidence between the state institutions and the province’s political elite.

Regrettably, the Baloch leadership also does not have much to offer. Tribal chiefs have been mistreating their own people and failing miserably while in office. They are rightly accused of deliberately mismanaging provincial resources and development funds. In fact, they have deliberately kept the people backward by not promoting education, failing to build hospitals and creating physical infrastructure. On the other hand, Balochi nationalists and tribal chiefs claim that the federal government has deprived them of their normal democratic rights and has taken control of their natural resources, thus throttling the Balochs economically and politically.

Extensive involvement of the military and age-old tribal customs has prevented normal political evolution in the province. Practically all Baloch nationalist parties that have a large following and include the Jamhoori Watan Party, Balochistan National party, National party and the Haq Tawar Party boycotted the last national and provincial elections. The current provincial assembly draws its strength more from the establishment than from the people. With politics and governance of the province being managed from outside, the representative character of the provincial government is indeed questionable.

General Musharraf erred by ordering a military operation against Akbar Bugti. The latter was perhaps among the few tribal leaders who had earlier been a part of government and was still prepared to engage with the establishment provided he was dealt with honourably. Instead, Musharraf adopted the fatal military option. The younger generation of tribal leadership has, since then, become more alienated and radicalised. General Musharraf, on the basis of his development projects, wrongly assessed that a majority of the Balochs are supportive of the government and tribal chiefs had limited following.

Tribal leaders claim that false cases are registered against them to keep them out of politics and force them to leave the country. Geography, poor communication links, the absence of political and economic development, antiquated social structures and lack of say in the management of natural resources are mainly responsible for the current state of Balochi frustration.

The main demands of the rebel groups are that security forces should be withdrawn. Political workers and insurgents under detention should be released and the government should make a public apology for its wrong doings. Their main demand however focuses on control of resources and a high level of provincial autonomy bordering on independence. The demand for provincial autonomy in accordance with the 1973 Constitution is perfectly valid and the federal government should grant it, but going beyond that is unacceptable. However, more crucial in the context of Balochistan are social reforms and unless these are undertaken, any sustainable development will not be feasible in a centuries-old tribal structure. The only way to bring the region in the mainstream is to allow genuine politics to take root. But for both political evolution and economic development, the government has to provide security which, so far, has been unsatisfactory.

The government accuses the Balochistan Liberation Army and other nationalist parties of having links with India, Afghanistan and other foreign agencies. The involvement of India was even brought to the attention of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh by our prime minister at Sharm-el- Shiekh and will remain a serious subject in future exchanges.

China, Iran and United States too have a deep interest in the province.

The establishment of the Gwadar deep-sea port, confirmed deposits of precious metals in the province and shared borders with Afghanistan and Iran has given Balochistan a unique strategic position. Gwadar has the potential of being a highly profitable communication link between China and the Persian Gulf, and between Central Asia and Pakistan. The US has a huge interest in the province to protect itself in Afghanistan, and considers it important in the context of its potential rivalry with China and poor relations with Iran. The power play of global and regional actors in an insurgency-ridden Balochistan is a serious challenge for Pakistan. Islamabad should realise that the peace security and stability of the province are closely interlinked with the integrity and future well being of Pakistan. And Balochi nationalism has to be assimilated and harmonised with the overall national interest, and not allowed to remain hostile to it. http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=195789

When the first Baloch insurgency broke out in 1948 to resist the illegal and forceful annexation of the Baloch-populated autonomous Kalat state with Pakistan, Manmohan Singh – today Indian prime minister – was barely a teenager while his Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani had not even been born to witness the rebellion’s magnitude. Yet, last month, both leaders in Sharm el-Sheikh discussed for the first time the indefatigable Baloch insurgency.

Pakistan has been blaming India for causing trouble in its resource-rich province. Gilani broached the issue with India at a time disgruntled Baloch youth have removed the Pakistani flag from schools and colleges and stopped playing the national anthem. Punjabi officers refuse to serve in Balochistan, fearing they would be target-killed. Islamabad attributes the unrest to ‘foreign involvement’. India is not the first to be blamed. Similar allegations were levelled in the past against the now defunct Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Iraq to discredit the indigenous movement for retaining a distinct Baloch identity. Indian assistance sounds ridiculous given that the Baloch do not share a border, common language, religion or history with India. Hardly has 1 per cent of Balochs have visited India.

The idea of Pakistan never attracted the secular Baloch. Ghose Baksh Bizanjo, a Baloch leader, said in 1947: “It is not necessary that by virtue of our being Muslims we should lose our freedom… If the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to join Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran… should also amalgamate with Pakistan.”

Over the years, Islamabad has applied a multi-pronged approach to deal with Balochista Apart from military operations launched in 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973 and 2002 to quash the rebellion, Islamabad adopted other tactics. First, it kept the province economically backward by denying it good infrastructure, mainly in education and health. Natural gas was discovered in Balochistan in 1951 and supplied to Punjab’s industrial units. The Balochs hardly benefit from their own gas.

Second, Balochs, whom the state views as traitors, were denied representation in the army, foreign services, federal departments, profitable corporations, Pakistan International Airlines, customs, railways and other key institutions. Third, Balochistan has historically been remote-controlled from Islamabad. A Pakistan army corps commander, often a Punjabi or a Pathan, and the inspector general of the Frontier Corps, a federal paramilitary force with less than 2 per cent Baloch representation, exert more power than the province’s elected chief minister. The intelligence agencies devise election plans and decide who has to come to the provincial parliament and who should be ousted.

Fourth, Islamabad has created a state of terror inside Balochistan. Hundreds of check posts have been established to harass people and restrict their movement. Forces and tanks are stationed even on campuses of universities. Fifth, national and international media are denied access to conflict zones in Balochistan. Several foreign journalists were beaten up supposedly by intelligence agencies personnel or deported when they endeavoured to report the actual situation. Sixth, international human rights organisations are denied access to trace the whereabouts of some 5,000 ‘missing persons’. Pakistan is also in a state of denial about the existence of around 2,00,000 internally displaced persons in Balochistan.

Seventh, Islamabad has been engaged in systematic target killing of key Baloch democratic leaders. Ex-governor and chief minister of Balochistan, Nawab Akbar Bugti, 79, became a victim once he demanded Baloch rights. Balach Marri, a Balochistan Assembly member, was killed to undermine the movement. In April this year, three other prominent leaders were whisked away by security forces and subsequently killed.

Eighth, Pakistan has pitted radical Taliban against secular and democratic Baloch forces. The state is brazenly funding thousands of religious schools across the province with the help of Arab countries to promote religious radicalisation. Elements supportive of Taliban were covertly helped by state institutions to contest and win general elections. They now enjoy sizeable representation in the Balochistan Assembly to legislate against the nationalists and secular forces.

Ninth, Islamabad has been using sophisticated American weapons, provided to crush Taliban, against the Baloch people. This has provided breathing space to Taliban hidden in Quetta and weeded out progressive elements. Finally, Afghan refugees are being patronised to create a demographic imbalance in the Baloch-dominated province.

Baloch leaders are critical of many democratic countries for not doing ‘enough’ to safeguard a democratic, secular Baloch people. I asked Bramdagh Bugti, a Baloch commander, about the India link. He laughed and said, “Would our people live amid such miserable conditions if we enjoyed support from India? We are an oppressed people… seeking help from India, the United States, the United Nations and the European Union to come for our rescue.”

The Baloch movement is rapidly trickling down from tribal chiefs to educated middle-class youth aggressively propagating their cause on Facebook and YouTube. This generation would understandably welcome foreign assistance but will not give up even if denied help from countries like India. The Baloch insist their struggle was not interrupted even at times when India and Pakistan enjoyed cordial relations.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-4878167,prtpage-1.cms

By Anwar Iqbal in The Dawn, July 31
WASHINGTON, July 30: Pakistan raised the issue of India’s involvement in Balochistan with the US, but provided no credible evidence to support their claim, says America’s special envoy Richard Holbrooke.

“I would be misleading, if I said it didn’t come up,” said Mr Holbrooke when asked if Pakistan brought up this issue during his visit to the country last week.

Responding to the second part of the question — “if Pakistan also gave credible evidence to support its claim” — Mr Holbrooke said: “The narrow answer to your question is no.”

Pakistan raised this issue with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as well at a bilateral meeting in Egypt on July 16.

On Wednesday, Mr Singh defended the inclusion of Balochistan in an India-Pakistan joint statement issued after the meeting but said he received no dossier from his Pakistani counterpart on India’s alleged involvement.

The New York Times reported on Wednesday that Pakistan linked its action against the Lashkar-e-Taiba with New Delhi ending its covert operations in Balochistan.

The report said that in conversations with the Obama administration, Pakistan’s army chief indicated that India needed to stop meddling in Balochistan in return for Pakistan’s actions against the Lashkar.

At his briefing in Washington on Wednesday afternoon, Mr Holbrooke also refused to discuss Occupied Kashmir, saying that it was outside his area of responsibility.

“That issue is outside my area of ability to discuss,” he said when asked to what extent the resolution of the Kashmir issue would help him in achieving the US goal to dismantle, disrupt and defeat the Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Mr Holbrooke cast doubt on the success of Pakistan’s Swat valley offensive, saying that it was unclear if the military had defeated the Taliban in the region or simply driven them underground.

“We don’t know exactly to what extent the Pakistani army dispersed or destroyed the enemy,” he told his first media briefing after his visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan last week. “The test of this operation is, of course, when the refugees return. Can they go home? Are they safe? And we’re just going to have to wait and see.”

Mr Holbrooke said that during his trip he wanted to visit Swat as well but the Pakistani military advised him not to do so now.

“I asked to go to Swat or Buner knowing that I wasn’t going to be able to go to Mingora, but I wanted to establish the limits of what was possible here,” he said.

“And the military said they really would prefer we didn’t do it now. And look, ‘prefer’ means ‘no’. So we didn’t.”

Mr Holbrooke, however, said the US was in constant touch with Pakistan to help it deal with any spill-over effect of stepped-up operations by international forces on the Afghan side.

He said that top US military commanders in Afghanistan often visited Pakistan to discuss the issue. “So the military-to-military discussions are helping to harmonise the situation” in the area, he said.

The purpose of these consultations, he said, was to alert Islamabad of any movement of militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

Mr Holbrooke urged the international community to provide sustained economic support to Pakistan so that it could deal with the problem of the Swat refugees and the economic and energy crises.

“Pakistan is critically important to the rest of the world” and could not be ignored.

Secondly, he said, what happened in Pakistan affected Afghanistan.

Mr Holbrooke also praised the Pakistani leadership for shifting some of its forces stationed along its eastern border with India to the western frontier bordering Afghanistan to fight out Taliban and Al Qaeda.

“The Pakistanis have moved a very large number of troops from their eastern border to their western border. That’s a historically significant redeployment,” he saidhttp://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/proof-of-indian-meddling-in-balochistan-not-provided-us-179