Category — America

By Iqbal Ahmad Khan
AT the heart of Pakistan’s foreign and security policies lies India and at the heart of our India policy lies Kashmir, Pakistan’s jugular vein as the country’s founder described it.

Kashmir has bedevilled Pakistan-India relations, is the source of insecurity and instability in the region and a cause of serious concern for the international community.

India reneged on its commitments to Pakistan, the United Nations and the Kashmiris to the holding of a plebiscite in the state. Six rounds of Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks, focused entirely on Kashmir, in 1962-3, proved inconclusive. The negotiations took place in the wake of India’s Himalayan debacle at the hands of China and on the serious prodding of the United States and Great Britain.

Having exhausted the path of diplomacy with an intransigent India, Pakistan embarked on a strategy to bring India to the table in a serious and meaningful engagement on the dispute. In 1965 Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in a bid to get Kashmiris to rise against their Indian occupiers. That did not happen. Instead, Pakistan and India got involved in a full-scale war, which neither could afford. After 17 days both were exhausted.

Whatever implications the war might have had for India, its consequences for Pakistan were disastrous. The perceived economic growth that Pakistan had been enjoying for several years and which was widely quoted as a model for Third World countries came to an abrupt halt. Western sanctions were imposed on Pakistan; East Pakistanis were extremely disenchanted leading Mujibur Rahman to launch his six-point programme and the country was engulfed in political turmoil. Six years later Pakistan was embroiled in another war with India. Its outcome was the disintegration of the country.

The East Pakistan tragedy should have prompted an earnest and urgent review of our policy towards India. The security establishment, however, was successful in having recommendations of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report, which called for the trial of Gen Yahya and his confederacy of generals, shelved. It also managed to have high priority assigned and substantial resources allocated to the rebuilding of the armed forces. After all, East Pakistan had to be avenged.

The military, once again, began to loom large in Pakistan’s politics leading to its logical conclusion. Not only was the democratic government overthrown in a coup d’état, but Pakistan’s most popular and accomplished prime minister was dispatched to the gallows.

The Indian factor again played a major role in Pakistan’s reaction to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The military dictator, who had usurped power on July 5, 1977, enthusiastically embraced the US which lent a new lease of life to his shaky and sanctioned government. The uni-dimensional military-based relationship with the US improved the military balance vis-à-vis India.

The victory of the Mujahideen against a superpower prompted him and his coterie of generals to (a) adopt the ‘strategic depth’ doctrine by ensuring that the new regime in Kabul should be so ingratiated to Pakistan as to invariably do its bidding; (b) employ the CIA-ISI Mujahideen model, successfully used in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, against India in occupied Kashmir. The former strategy led to the emergence of the Taliban Frankenstein; the latter to such jihadi outfits as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, Jaish-i-Mohammad and the Harkat-ul-Ansar.

It did not take long for Al Qaeda, the Taliban and others to establish a nexus for the use of terror against their adversaries. Neither were the Taliban able to provide strategic depth, nor were the jihadis able to coerce India into settling the Kashmir dispute. The policy, in fact, dangerously backfired, with these battle-hardened and self-sustaining militants posing an existentialist threat to Pakistan itself.

As if the failure of our strategy was not enough of a setback, an emboldened military embarked upon a course that brought serious embarrassment and disgrace to the country. The overthrow in October 1999 of a legally constituted, democratically elected popular government was a direct consequence of the Kargil episode — once again the outcome of our policy of confronting India.

The multiple wars and skirmishes with India (futile at best) and the ensuing instability and insecurity in the region have adversely impacted on the internal political dynamics of Pakistan. The imbalance of a powerful military and a fragile democracy has seriously undermined the political process and impaired the healthy growth of civil institutions. The pursuit of highly ambitious and inherently unrealistic policies of ‘strategic depth’ and ‘coercive diplomacy’ have overstretched our limited resources and subjected our foreign relations to avoidable stresses.

A policy of confrontation with India — and its close cousins militancy and coup d’états — contains within itself the seeds of our destruction and must be avoided like the plague. It has become a millstone around our neck.

The real threat to Pakistan comes not from India, but from militant extremism. The second biggest source of instability emanates, also not from India, but from the widespread poverty and the low levels of human development that characterise our society. We need to divert the enormous time and resources that we continue to invest in our confrontation with India towards fighting militancy and getting rid of the all-pervasive poverty, ignorance and disease. Pakistan’s history and its present precarious condition demand a serious and honest appraisal of its traditional India policy with the objective of establishing a close, cooperative and tension-free relationship. Realpolitik and sound common sense dictate that Pakistan and India should live in peace and friendship.

The proposed change in our India policy is not tantamount to an acceptance of India’s hegemony. On the contrary, an economically vibrant, politically stable, socially cohesive nuclear Pakistan with 170 million economically empowered, healthy and educated citizens should be able to exude enough confidence and maturity to deter any entity contemplating domination. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/time-to-shun-the-past-279

Mir Suleman Daud Baloch, Khan of Kalat

LONDON: The UK-based self-exiled Khan of Kalat has said that without international mediation he would not become part of any talks to address the security-related and economic problems of Balochistan.

Mir Suleman Daud Baloch, who is awaiting a decision on his asylum application from the House of Lords, plans to move the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the status of Kalat, which became part of Pakistan under an agreement signed on March 27, 1948, between Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the then Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan.

A news item three days back had termed it a positive sign that the Khan of Kalat had not yet moved the ICJ over the accusation that Pakistan has not fulfilled the promises it had made at the time of signing the treaty, but the real reason behind the delay is the Khan of Kalat’s inability to travel outside of Britain while the British government considers his appeal.

Immigration experts believe that the 35th Khan of Kalat, who has been seeking asylum since July 2007, will ultimately be granted asylum because of his profile and the ongoing unrest in the restive province. It has become almost a standard procedure in the UK to refuse asylum claims in the first phase no matter how serious the case is but appeals with serious grounds of fear of persecution are ultimately allowed and the Khan of Kalat’s case falls in this bracket, an immigration expert told this correspondent.

Speaking to The News, the Khan said he was not interested in the government’s offers and said he was determined to move international forums to seek attention towards the problems of Balochistan.

“I don’t need any offers from the government. I came out of Pakistan on my own free will and will return when I want. My return to Pakistan and becoming part of the so-called dialogue process in not the solution to problems my people are facing. My people have given me a mandate and a duty to take their case to the ICJ and I am determined to stand by them,” the Khan of Kalat said in reference to a September 2006 grand Baloch Jirga, convened after about 126 years, which recommended that a case should be lodged in the ICJ against what it termed violation of agreements signed by the State of Kalat, the Crown of Britain and the Government of Pakistan pertaining to the sovereignty and rights of the Baloch people.

The Khan said that President Asif Ali Zardari and Pakistan’s High Commissioner to the UK Wajid Shamsul Hasan had phoned him several months ago, asking him to return to Pakistan for negotiations but he told the President bluntly that the approaches he was taking to address the Baloch issue were ineffective.

“I told President Zardari that Balochistan’s issue cannot be solved through all parties conferences, increasing the budgets and making more hollow promises. I told him that he may be well-meaning but he was powerless to do anything on the ground. The real power, he knows, lies elsewhere. If Zardari was powerful and independent in taking decisions, why would he go to the United Nations to seek justice for his wife Benazir Bhutto’s murder?”

Refusing to be part of any efforts to settle the Baloch issue, the Khan of Kalat, who lives with his family in Cardiff, lay down only one condition to become part of the talks.

“The talks have to be mediated by the United States of America, Russia, the United Kingdom or other European countries. The Pakistani government should choose anyone of them. Accept that and you will find me ready to sit down for meaningful talks. There is no point for us any more in getting engaged with powerless people. That option is off the table now. Sixty years of broken promises have broken my faith completely in the sincerity of Islamabad.”

Answering a question, His Highness, as it states on his passport, said that Governor Zulfikar Magsi and many others in the provincial government had said it on record that they are powerless and cannot promise any change to the status quo. “Invitations to talks and big promises were a hoax being played to divert the attention from the real issues.” http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23205

By Man Mohan Kaul
If there are any doubts about who is calling the shots in Pakistan, here is further evidence that says that the Army does it.

The Pakistan Army has made it clear to the country’s Parliament. lt that cannot withdraw its forces from its present location. The context here is clearly the Indian border.

The Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, said at an in-camera briefing to MPs on May 15 that the Army cannot be withdrawn from its locations of covering the expected attack routes on the border with India.

Specifically, he told the MPs that the Army would not mount its operations as per the diktats and preferences of any outside force.

The context here is very clear: US President Barack Obama impressed upon President Asif Ali Zardari when the two met early in May that Pakistan Army should withdraw its forces from the relatively peaceful border and re-deploy its personnel and equipment in the current fight against the Taliban.

Zardari responded by agreeing to it in principle and later said while interacting with the American that some units had actually been shifted.

But he spoke too early and Kayani has all but vetoed the move.

Only one newspaper carried the story that was probably an official leak from the Army General Headquarters. No one is prepared to vouch whether the account is accurate but Pakistan watchers are confident that this was a report based on the briefing Kiani gave the lawmakers.

It was about the four-hour in-camera briefing. Had the Army taken a decision and was the Parliament being simply informed? This remains a matter of conjecture. .

Either way, it reflects the thinking of the Pakistan Army and the lawmakers were being told who is the real boss when it comes to matters pertaining to national security and that too, where India is involved.

If there is a formal decision by the Army, no announcement was made: perhaps it was not found necessary. The Army simply let its mind be known and did not want the fledgling civilian government to take the diplomatic rap from the Obama Administration.

Here, one is not even speculating on the angry Indian reaction despite the preoccupation with the elections and formation of a new government.

The Pakistan Army is upset that the Americans have been trying hard in their Afghan-Pak thinking to make Pakistan withdraw the bulk of its Army from positions of confronting India to its western borders where the Taliban trouble is still going strong.

What is clear is that Pakistan Army is simply not willing to withdraw from positions of checkmating Indian military forces.

On the other hand, it plans to up its ante on the border with India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, to tell the Americans that their assessment of the situation on the Indo-Pak border is grossly inadequate and ill-informed.

The next question arises whether Pakistan would continue to resist American pressures to relieve the bulk of its troops to serve on its northwestern frontier.

This remains a billion dollar question, literally and figuratively, since the US is bending backwards to salvage the sinking Pakistani economy and fund its defence acquisitions in the name of fighting the Taliban.

One assessment is that the US has also prodded the other NATOP nations and Japan to pool in a whopping $ 23 billion over the next five years.

But Obama Administration and the US/Nato concerns and efforts are a present-day developments, while Pakistan’s struggle to maintain its identity that it fears could be obliterated by India is as old as its own life.

It does not require Kiani to spell it out and the Pakistani lawmakers to understand and appreciate that Pakistan’s very existence has depended upon opposing India.

The very emergence of Pakistan was because its founding father felt convinced that Muslims could not live in a Hindu-dominated India.

It needs recalling here that Pakistan in its very first year of existence devoted some 43 per cent of its budget to defence. It was meant in Muslim League government’s thinking that it would prevent Pakistan from being gobbled up by India.

But that set the benchmark. High defence spending aimed at defending Pakistan against Indian threat, real or perceived, has been the story of Pakistan for the last six decades. This is now almost an article of faith for all conservative sections. To move away would be such a radical shift in Pakistan policy that it is hard to imagine it can ever be agreed to.

The Americans are recommending such a radical departure from traditional Pakistani view that has congealed into an ideology. The conservative political class – the whole of it, actually — does think that India is an existential and permanent threat to Pakistan.

To move away from the original is now too hard an exercise. No regime in Pakistan – military, civilian, quasi-civilian-quasi-military – not to speak of the liberals and the once-influential socialists, ever could deny the demands of the country’s armed forces. Everything is just brushed aside when it comes to “defendant of the nation”, particularly when this ‘defence’ is enmeshed with the “defence of Islam,” and “Kashmir”

Pakistan joined, willy-nilly under Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the global war against terrorism, doing a complete U-turn in the support the Taliban rulers of Kabul. But decades before that, Pakistan had joined the West-led military alliances that were meant to counter the communists who ruled Russia.

That Pakistan has managed to sup with the Chinese since the 1960s, and that china remains a communist nation that the US and the West view with concern is a different story altogether.

Pakistan agreed to join the west in lieu of military and some economic aid. The Americans were clear headed. They had made it plain from day one that their aid is not to be used against India. But did that ever happen?

When he launched his misadventure in 1965, its grandiose name was “Operation Gibraltar”, Ayub Khan believed that the America who not do much beyond shouting and protesting if Pakistan used its aided equipment against India

He did use it in 1965 war and the Americans were, expectedly, angry. They imposed sanctions on Pakistan; aid was suspended for some years.

But the Americans always knew that Pakistan would do such a thing when needed. They showed their anger more for the record than actual punishment of Pakistan. It was more to please India. Later America relented and the aid was resumed.

New sanctions were imposed on Pakistan and were fairly quickly lifted each time Pakistan used the American-supplied military hardware against India.

The situation is no different and all concerned – the Pakistanis, the Americans and even the Indians – know it. The Indian dismay at the Obama Administration’s Af-Pak policy is precisely on this ground. Only, in the more complex situation that develops in the new century, it finds open protests against the US and the West counter-productive.

Pakistan and its Army cannot possibly annoy Americans in any big way. Without American aid Pakistan Army cannot be sustained. It now requires anything from $ 500 million to 1 billion a year in foreign exchange.

This is only consideration. There are others: Can Pakistan say no to what Americans may insist on? Can Pakistan sustain a policy of defiance to America? It is easier said in a conference or in a briefing.

Some political posturing is permissible by the donors but not in terms of fundamental choices. And this is precisely the message conveyed through Kayani’s briefing to the country’s lawmakers.

Kayani’s message is: If Pakistan Army is expected to take its forces off the Indian border, then why have the Army at all? Taliban, or for that matter, even Al Qaida, are recent phenomena and will come and go. India will still be around to “gobble up” Pakistan